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Abstract
This paper provides a formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation in the management of
common property resources. We develop a dynamic model that includes moral norms or a sense
of ‘identity,’ and show that cooperation may – but need not – be an equilibrium outcome in the
absence of intervention by a managing agency or punishment by peers. We demonstrate that
outside intervention has ambiguous effects when identity matters – it may reduce welfare of the
agents harvesting the stock.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Property rights for many natural and environmental resources are imperfectly 
defined or enforced.  While imperfect property rights in the presence of 
appropriation externalities may result in excessive use, circumstances also arise 
where communities are able to overcome such social dilemmas.  Various terms, 
including social capital, community governance and social cohesion, are used to 
capture the idea that trust and a shared willingness to live by norms are key 
factors determining how efficiently common property resources (CPR) are used.  
In recent years academic interest in these issues is flourishing. 
The economic literature on CPR management has focused mainly on two 
interrelated topics.  First is the efficiency and distributional consequences of CPR 
management versus alternative forms of property rights [Weitzman, 1974, de 
Meza and Gould, 1987, Brito et al., 1997; Baland and Francois, 2005].  Second, a 
rapidly growing literature explores the motivations for cooperation in the 
commons – the ‘social capital’ focus mentioned above.  Why do people forego 
private gains for the public good?  This question strikes at the heart of the 
overlapping research agendas of institutional, environmental and development 
economics, and it is the main issue addressed in this paper.  
Economists argue that agents will cooperate when their best interest is to 
do so.  Among the potential mechanisms to align social and private incentives are 
reputation effects, monitoring and punishment by peers, and future gains from 
cooperation [Ostrom, 1990, Ostrom et al., 1992, 1994, Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996, Mailath and Samuelson 2006].  The difficulty, however, has been to 
reconcile the theoretical behavior of Homo economicus with the plethora of 
behaviors observed in ‘the field’ and in laboratory settings.  Three complementary 
traditions in economics attempt to do so.  First, cooperation can be sustained as a 
sub-game perfect equilibrium in the presence of punishment opportunities – 
including ostracism – when forward-looking agents interact in (infinitely) 
repeated and dynamic games.1  However, the Folk Theorem indicates that many 
other stable equilibria may emerge as well, and generally does not indicate which 
equilibrium will materialize.  Second, a few papers analyze the accumulation of 
trust through repeated interaction and improved information, facilitating 
cooperative behavior over time [Watson, 1999, Fafchamps 2004]. Finally, 
cooperation may emerge as a stable Nash equilibrium in evolutionary models 
involving interactions across individuals, in which myopic agents replicate the 
behavior of more successful individuals in the community [Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996, Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau, 2007].   
                                                
1 E.g., see Kandori [1992], and Kranton [1996], on sustaining cooperative relationships; for a 
focus on common property resources refer to Dutta [1995], Kranton [1996], Hannesson [1997], 
Polasky et al. [2006], and Tarui [2007]. 
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Our model fits into the third tradition.  Prior work within this tradition has 
analyzed outcomes under different types of strategic interactions – that is, under 
different assumptions about how individuals’ conservation and regulatory actions 
affect others’ utility.  Sethi and Somanathan model two types of interactions.  The 
first is a common harvest externality associated with the common pool nature of 
the resource.  The second interaction is based on the assumption that agents who 
choose low effort can punish individuals choosing high harvest efforts, though at 
some cost to themselves.  This increases the basin of attraction associated with the 
low effort equilibrium.  However, multiple equilibria are still possible, with each 
potential stable equilibrium involving a homogenous population: all agents either 
choose high effort or they all choose low effort.   
Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau [hereafter, OEVG] adopt a similar harvest 
model but they do not model punishment.  Rather, they assume that, beyond 
harvest returns, choosing low effort leads to inclusion in a social group that yields 
benefits, such as respect and friendship, to its members.  These benefits are 
increasing in the proportion of individuals choosing low effort.  This effect 
counteracts the strategic complementarities that stem from the harvest relation 
and, in contrast to Sethi and Somanathan, can result in stable equilibria involving 
heterogeneous populations, with some agents choosing low effort and others 
choosing high effort.  This outcome is consistent with observations of reality, as 
compliant and non-compliant behaviors have co-existed for long stretches in 
many traditional societies. 
We extend this literature by investigating a broader set of interactions that 
combines features of the earlier models.  As with prior work, payoffs depend on 
effort choices.  Additionally, we model choices about personal values that 
influence the payoffs individuals derive from their own effort choices as well as 
from social interactions.  Values are therefore not simply based on resource use 
decisions, and social interactions can occur and produce benefits in spite of 
disagreements over these decisions.   
In our model, personal values are based on the notion that people have an 
intrinsic motivation to behave cooperatively by following “moral” or “social 
norms” [Dowell et al. 1998, Lindbeck 1997].2  The idea that following social 
                                                
2 Norms are expectations and beliefs about how one should behave.  Moral norms are internalized 
rules of conduct, and therefore potentially self-policing [Baland and Platteau, 1996].  Violating the 
norm is intrinsically costly as it causes feelings of guilt and shame.  The adverse consequences 
associated with norm violating are thus not necessarily punishment by peers or regulators.  Much 
of the literature on cooperation and social capital emphasizes the key role of enforcement [e.g., 
McCarthy et al., 2001] and willingness to ‘punish’ those who do not live by the norm [e.g., 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002],  While norms (and the emotions associated with norm violations by 
others) facilitate punishment, we will abstract from this in what follows.  The paper’s main results 
may apply in other contexts than management of common pools, but the model and discussion are 
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norms may be privately optimal when norm-violation causes disutility goes back 
to Becker [1976], and has recently been formalized and extended by Akerlof and 
Kranton [2000; hereafter AK].  In particular, AK introduce social psychology’s 
concept of ‘identity’ by augmenting utility to account for ‘identity gains’ when 
social norms are followed, and ‘identity losses’ when norms are violated.3  
Different individuals may live by different norms, experiencing disutility when 
deviating from them.  Moreover, individuals may acquire utility from associating 
with others like themselves. 
Importantly, our model allows people to update their identities, and hence 
change the costs and benefits to which they are exposed.4  People have the ability 
to adapt their psychology (i.e., their ‘beliefs’ about true norms) to reduce 
dissonance between behavior and beliefs, or to associate with another group 
within the community.  While the AK model allows for two mechanisms to 
“maintain a sense of unity” between prescriptions and norms (that is; via actions 
to reduce anxiety and via cognitive dissonance), we essentially introduce a third 
mechanism by allowing individuals to adjust their identity over time.  In our 
model, resource stocks, identities, and behaviors co-evolve over time. We 
therefore endogenize not only the distribution of behavior and payoffs, but also 
the distribution of payoff functions.  
What evidence motivates the (dynamic) identity model?  Economic 
experiments support the idea that there are different ‘types’ within populations – 
some more inclined to cooperation and others more inclined to defection [e.g., 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Offerman et al 2006, Fischbacher et al. 2001].  Similar 
observations emerge from case studies on CPR management [e.g. Feeny et al., 
1996, Baland and Platteau, 1996, Henrich et al., 2001].  But such moral 
imperatives are not written in stone.  For economic models of contingent moral 
motivation, refer to Brekke et al. [2003] and Nyborg et al. [2006].  Focusing on 
the case of CPR management, Baland and Platteau [1996, 123] write that “moral 
norms are subject to erosion; they form a ‘social capital’ … liable to depreciation, 
especially so if norm-abiding individuals come to realize that many people around 
them behave opportunistically.”  When surrounded by ‘defectors,’ cooperators 
start discounting the relevance of living by the norms and, vice versa, defectors 
                                                                                                                                     
cast in terms of CPRs as this is an application where moral norms obviously matter, and because 
this application is readily amenable for a dynamic analysis.   
3 This approach is distinct from work focusing on “external” value of having a certain identity – 
think of reputation effects in repeated games [e.g. Nowak 2006].   
4 Our model is of course linked to existing work on the endogenous evolution of preferences.  
Kuran and Sandholm (2008) study socialization and self-persuasion in the context of cultural 
integration, Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Francois and Zabojnik (2007) analyse parental 
socialization and economic outcomes.  Related papers in a parallel literature rooted in evolutionary 
game theory include Guth and Yaari (1992) and Dekel et al. (2007). 
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may internalize norms when it is in their interest to do so.5  Sociological 
experiments [Taifel, 1978, Haslam 2001] confirm the malleability of group 
identification and support the idea that identities can change over time.  
This paper has four main contributions.  First, we extend the identity 
model by making it dynamic, modeling how the abundance of ‘types with a 
certain payoff function’ in the community evolves in response to payoff 
differences.  This enables us to analyze the accumulation or erosion of social 
capital, as measured by the distribution of beliefs facilitating or hampering 
conservation (in contrast to OEVG, who measure social capital by the number of 
people behaving as a conservationist).  This approach, whereby individuals self-
select into a certain identity in response to interactions with others and with 
nature, provides a new mechanism to understand the evolution of preferences in 
individuals and populations.   
Second, we provide a novel theoretical underpinning for the observation 
that cooperation in the commons can – but need not – occur in the absence of 
regulation by outsiders or peers.  This is consistent with the observation that some 
CPRs are managed sustainably whereas others suffer from the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ [e.g. Benin and Pender, 2006, Lopez, 1998, Ahuja, 1998].  
Third, our model produces a variety of potential equilibria, encompassing 
predictions from earlier theoretical models as special cases.  Unlike Sethi and 
Somanathan but consistent with OEVG, we find mixed outcomes with only some 
individuals conserving might emerge as an equilibrium outcome.  However, and 
unlike OEVG, we also identify cases where heterogeneous stable equilibria 
cannot emerge. 
Fourth, we show that introducing effort-based incentives to encourage 
conserving behavior yields ambiguous effects in a setting where identity matters.  
Specifically, an incentive that encourages conserving behavior (low effort) by all 
may not encourage everyone to switch to a conservationist identity.  As a result, 
the long-run welfare effects of the regulation are ambiguous.  A regulation that 
induces everyone to adopt conserving behavior but not a conservationist identity 
will result in a welfare loss relative to the case of a homogeneous population of 
conservationists.  In general, for policies to be effective or efficient, regulators 
need to know the underlying distribution of identities in the population of 
individuals that they try to regulate.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we introduce the ‘identity’ 
concept as well as identity-dependent utility gains and losses.  In section 3 we 
develop a dynamic model where individuals can both change their behavior as 
                                                
5 Interestingly, Baland and Platteau [1996, 122] mention evidence that people are more responsive 
to the costs of living by moral norms than by the potential gains that can be had by discounting 
them (in our parlance; adopting another identity).  In what follows we ignore this asymmetry 
between benefits and costs, and simply consider overall payoff differences. 
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well as their beliefs (but accounting for the fact that changing behavior is easier 
than changing identity).  In section 4 we analyze the model and distinguish 
between different scenarios.  In section 5 we introduce regulation.  The 
conclusions ensue. 
2. IDENTITY IN COMMON POOL MANAGEMENT: A STATIC MODEL 
Society has different social categories (types or identities), with different forms of 
“prescribed behavior.”  A simple example is between ‘men’ and ‘women.’ 
Different ideal behaviors are usually associated with these identities, and 
“violating the prescribed behavior causes anxiety and discomfort in oneself and in 
others.  Gender identity, then, changes the payoffs from different actions” [AK, p. 
716].6  While the ‘gender’ identity is usually pre-selected by nature, people often 
can choose their identity and then experience significant peer pressure to behave 
in a particular manner.  Examples include joining the army, student fraternities, or 
a street gang.  Rules of behavior are associated with each of these social 
categories, and violating these rules causes anxiety that individuals act to reduce. 
We adopt the basic AK model and modify it for the CPR case.  Two basic 
assumptions are that people have identity-based payoffs derived from: (i) their 
own actions; and (ii) from others’ actions.  We employ these assumptions in a 
CPR model with two identities: conservationists and non-conservationists.  The 
latter are also labeled as “defectors” in what follows, although the individuals in 
question probably prefer the label “entrepreneurs” for themselves.  We begin with 
a static model, but later make it dynamic, allowing agents to update their identity.  
This extension is obviously interesting and relevant in the context of evolving 
moral norms, and the accumulation and erosion of social capital.   
Each identity-type has its own social or moral norm defining the preferred 
level of harvesting effort (henceforth labeled effort).  For simplicity, but without 
great loss, we follow Sethi and Somanathan [1996] and OEVG [2007] and 
consider the tractable case of two fixed effort levels: high and low effort.  The 
moral norm of conservationists is to choose low harvest effort level EL, which 
represents cooperative behavior.  In the words of OEVG [2007: 396]: “through 
years of communal living, society members have developed a sense of what level 
of exploitation is ‘desirable,’ or have reached an understanding as to what effort 
level will permit a reasonable exploitation of the resource.”  This may involve 
respecting certain restrictions (perhaps taboos) with respect to the timing of 
harvesting or the types of technologies that are allowed.  Defectors’ preferred 
                                                
6 Note that this example also nicely illustrates the importance of treating ‘identity’ as a dynamic 
concept, subject to change.  For example, the mainstream norm regarding whether ‘decent women’ 
should engage in paid labor has changed considerably during recent decades (e.g. Vendrik 1993). 
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behavior is to exploit short-term opportunities for personal gain, even if doing so 
imposes costs on others.  For simplicity, the norm for defectors is to ‘defect’ from 
the cooperation strategy by choosing the highest feasible effort level EH, so that 
EH>EL.    
We begin with a general model to introduce some basic concepts.  In the 
following section, we present a fully-specified model that is more amenable to 
detailed analysis.  Consider a community with a large fixed number of 
individuals.  The utility of an individual of identity type I (I = C for 
conservationists; I = D for defectors) who chooses behavior J (J=L for low effort 
and J=H for high effort) is denoted 
(1)  ),,( SzxU IJ .  
In (1), x  is the overall proportion of individuals with conservationist 
identity in the community.  The variable z is the overall proportion of individuals 
who cooperate (i.e., respect the norm of conservationists) by choosing low effort.  
Specifically, DC zxxzz )1( −+= , where Iz  is the proportion of identity-type I
individuals who cooperate (note that CD zz −≠ 1 ) – as will become evident below 
both defectors and cooperators may chose to select low effort levels.  Finally, S is 
the resource stock.  Individuals are myopic and take S as given, though later we 
show how the stock changes over time in response to individuals’ harvest choices. 
One of the possible characteristics of an identity-based model, as 
identified by AK, is that individuals may gain utility from being among their own 
kind (or, alternatively, a utility loss from being with those of other identities): 
(2) 0>∂
∂
x
UCJ ; 0<∂
∂
x
UDJ  0][ >∂
−∂⇒
x
UU DJCJ . 
We refer to the final relation in (2) as a fraternal complementarity, which 
indicates the relative welfare of conservationists (defectors) is increasing 
(decreasing) in the share of cooperators in the community.  This part of the model 
is similar to the benefits of group membership in OEVG’s [2007] model, which is 
the key feature of their model.  The difference is that these benefits depend on 
identities in our model, whereas they depend on behaviors in OEVG’s model.  
Moreover, utility of defectors is directly affected by changes in the composition of 
the population in terms of identities. 
In addition to fraternal complementarities, identity-based gains or losses 
are associated with own behavior and behavior of others.  Following AK, one’s 
actions cause disutility to oneself if these actions violate the prescriptions of one’s 
own identity.  This means violating the norm associated with one’s identity.  For a 
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conservationist, violating the norm of restraint produces ambiguous net welfare 
effects: it raises harvest levels but also involves psychological costs so that the net 
effect is ambiguous a priori.  In contrast, norm violation unambiguously produces 
welfare losses for a defector: harvest revenues are reduced and there is also an 
identity cost. 
In addition, one’s actions cause disutility to others (external costs) if these 
actions violate the norms associated with others’ identities.  That is, others’ 
actions that run counter to one’s own norms cause anxiety: 0)1(/ <−∂∂ zUCJ  and 
0/ <∂∂ zU DJ .  We refer to these costs as outrage costs, and in the specified 
model below we show that outrage costs can generate strategic 
complementarities: 0/][ >∂−∂ zUU DJCJ .  The relative benefits from being a 
conservationist are larger (smaller) if others cooperate (defect); alternatively, it 
also means that the relative benefits from being a defector are smaller (larger) 
when others cooperate (defect).  Though different in spirit, these external costs are 
mathematically analogous to the punishment and enforcement costs of Sethi and 
Somanathan’s [1996] model, which is the key feature of their model.  
2.1 A specified model 
Our specification of the common pool model is analogous to Sethi and 
Somanathan [1996] and OEVG [2007] in that we define utility simply as the 
expected payoffs to individuals, which is the sum of harvest profits and the 
additional costs and benefits associated with identities and norms.  We also follow 
their assumptions of a fixed price for harvests, a fixed unit cost of effort, and that 
harvests depend on both the level of effort employed and also the resource stock 
level.  For simplicity, we normalize the harvest price to unity and the effort cost to 
zero, so that harvests equal profits.  An individual’s harvests are defined by a 
scaled Schaefer harvest function, EiS where i = L, H indexes ‘low’ and ‘high’ 
effort levels, respectively.  Note that this harvest function explains why utility in 
(1) depends on S.  Assume that ‘low’ harvest effort EL results in larger long-run 
equilibrium profits than does ‘high’ harvest effort EH.  If some individuals choose 
‘high’ harvest effort EH, then sustainable harvest falls, but of course short-run 
profits of these defectors rises.  Hence, a social dilemma eventuates. 
Our only substantive departures from Sethi and Somanathan [1996] and 
OEVG [2007] are that (i) those models assume diminishing returns to individual 
effort due to congestion externalities, and (ii) EL and EH are stock-dependent in 
those models but not in ours.  If we think of myopic profit maximization as the 
base case from which each of these models (including ours) is compared, then the 
effect of congestion externalities is to create the potential for multiple equilibria: 
everyone either chooses high effort or low effort.  By ignoring congestion 
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externalities, our profit maximization base case exhibits a single equilibrium in 
which the basin of attraction for defection is larger.  This simplifies the analysis 
and helps us to focus on the identity based benefits and external behavioral costs, 
which are the key features in our model.  Our assumption of stock-independent 
effort levels is also a simplification, the primary impact of which will be to reduce 
the number of potential equilibrium stock levels – but not the important 
qualitative result that more effort generally results in smaller stocks.  
Now consider the additional costs and benefits arising from individuals’ 
choices of behaviors and the distribution of identities among resource users.  First, 
consider the external impacts of identity, associated with the fraternal 
complementarity.  AK develop one model where individuals suffer an identity 
loss when encountering individuals with a different identity.7  Without any loss 
we turn this argument around – people don’t suffer an identity loss when they 
meet somebody with a different identity, but instead earn a benefit when meeting 
somebody of their own type.  Liberals like to hang out with liberals because they 
share some deep values (even if the other occasionally votes conservative).  We 
model this benefit as Iow  (where, as above, I = C,D, and the subscript ‘o’ refers to 
“others”) so the external benefits for conservationists are simply Coxw  (and for 
defectors are Dowx)1( − ). 
Next, consider welfare effects when one’s own actions conflict with 
internalized norms.  If conservationists choose EH (which feels like cheating to 
them, and triggers guilt) they suffer a utility loss, monetized as a cost Csw .  The 
superscript ‘C’ refers to the conservationist identity and the subscript ‘s’ refers to 
‘self’ to indicate that the losses are caused by own behavior.  In contrast, if 
defectors choose EL (which makes them feel like a wimp foregoing a profitable 
opportunity), they suffer a utility loss valued at Dsw .   
In addition, we follow AK and introduce cross-strategy impacts – the 
impacts of others’ harvesting strategies on one’s utility.  Such impacts could arise 
in various ways, but perhaps the most compelling impacts are negative ones that 
stem from the inherent tension between cooperation and defection.  We focus on 
these.  Individuals who choose high effort, EH, impose a (normalized) cost k on 
cooperating conservationists who suffer a utility loss from seeing some of their 
fellow villagers violating the conservationists’ norm.8  For instance, they may feel 
                                                
7 We assume no uncertainty about the identity of others.  People choose their type and 
immediately signal it to the rest.  The model could be expanded to allow for asymmetric 
information about identities, which is left for future work. 
8 This external effect may be a function of the stock, and without loss we could also rewrite the 
model so that the externality both cooperating conservationists and defectors (as opposed to just 
cooperating conservationists).  This is ignored to streamline the presentation.   
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angry when others refuse to play by their rules.  Similarly, defectors who 
cooperate suffer a utility loss if they observe others defecting.  One reason may be 
that such observations add salience to the regret that they have missed out on a 
profitable opportunity, making them feel like a sucker.  Denote this cost as g.  It is 
also an outrage cost, but one where the defector is outraged with him/herself.  We 
refer to k and g as the “outrage costs” of others choosing high effort, and these 
outrage costs are the source of strategic complementarities in our model.  We 
reasonably assume that conservationists do not impose similar costs on defectors 
and that defectors do not impose outrage costs on conservationists who defect.9   
Given two identities (conservationists and defectors) and two behaviors 
(high and low effort), we have to consider four different combinations of identity 
type and behavior.  The expected payoffs for these four combinations are 
presented in Table 1.   Assume for now no fines; F=0, we return to fines and 
regulation in section 5.  As before, the variable x in Table 1 denotes the share of 
conservationists in the population, which will be endogenized below.  Note that 
the expected payoffs from choosing high harvest effort levels for a defector 
always exceed the payoffs from choosing low harvest levels (in the absence of 
regulation, this is true regardless of outrage costs).  Therefore Dz  is always at its 
equilibrium value of zero (defectors always choose 4igh effort), so that z = xzC 
denotes the share of the total population choosing low effort.   
Table 1. Expected payoffs for individuals of different identities and behaviors 
in the presence of regulation.a  
Identity/harvest effort level Expected payoffs  
Conservationist/low (I=C, J=L) UCL = ELS + x Cow – (1 – z)k 
Conservationist/high (I=C, J=H) UCH = EHS - CSw  + x
C
ow  – F 
Average Payoff Conservationists 
CU  = zC[ELS + x
C
ow – (1 – z)k]  
+ (1-zC)[EHS - CSw  + x
C
ow  – F] 
Defector/low (I=D, J=L) UDL = ELS - DSw  + (1 – x)
D
ow  – (1 – z)g  
Defector/high (I=D, J=H) UDH = EHS + (1 – x) Dow  – F 
Average Payoff to Defectors  
DU = zD[ELS - 
D
Sw  + (1 – x)
D
ow  – (1 – z)g]  
+ (1-zD)[ EHS + (1 – x) Dow  – F] 
a Set k=g=0 for the case of “no outrage costs”.  Set F=0 for the case of no regulation. 
                                                
9 We could easily incorporate such costs but, as will become evident, equilibrium never has 
cooperators who choose high effort while defectors choose low effort.  Hence, we ignore this 
possibility. Of course, depending on the specific (cultural) context alternative specifications that 
may lead to such outcomes might be feasible, and in those instances these additional costs may 
have ramifications for the dynamics and equilibria that eventuate. 
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Payoffs depend on the distribution of identities and behaviors.  This payoff 
structure potentially allows for multiple qualitatively different equilibria (or 
combinations of identity and behavior) in the community.  Without adding more 
structure to the model, the outcomes may range from (x=1, z=1) to the polar 
opposite case of (x=0, z=0).  Heterogeneous identities and heterogeneous harvest 
effort choices are also feasible: co-existence of cooperators and defectors (with 
cooperators choosing low and defectors choosing high effort levels, but also 
where both types choose high effort, or even where some cooperators choose low 
and others choose high effort levels).  To analyze the stability of these steady 
states we develop an explicitly dynamic model – one in which strategies, 
identities, and resource stocks all evolve over time.   
3. A DYNAMIC MODEL 
We extend the static model by allowing a unit measure of agents to adjust both 
identity and behavior over time in response to changing conditions, recognizing 
that behavior may adjust more quickly than deeply-rooted identity.10  People may 
be free to adjust their own identity, but the spirit of the concept implies that they 
do not do this as easily as they can change a pair of socks.  To capture this idea 
we introduce ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ dynamics [see Bergstrom and Lachman 2003].  
Specifically, changes in the identity composition of the population (x) are taken to 
occur slowly relative to changes in cooperative behaviors (zD and zc) and the 
resource stock (S).  For example, Bandiera et al. [2006] demonstrate that 
individuals quickly learn how to adapt their behavior (and to adopt a cooperative 
norm) if it is in their interest.  Internalizing such norms, however, likely takes 
longer. 
As above, we start with a general model to outline the main mechanisms, 
and then switch to a specified model that is analytically tractable.  Following 
Sethi and Somanathan [1996] and OEVG [2007], we use replicator dynamics to 
describe the quick adjustment of behavior (effort choice), and we also use this 
approach to model the gradual evolution of identity shares in the population.  
Specifically, a strategy increases in use when it generates more utility than the 
average level of utility in society: 
                                                
10 Since people are free to eventually update their identity, heterogeneity in terms of a mix of 
identities is distinct from heterogeneity in terms of variables beyond the control of agents, such as 
gender, wealth (to some extent), caste, or race.  For analyses of the impact of heterogeneity on 
cooperation, refer to Adhikari and Lovett [2006] and Benin and Pender [2006]. 
10
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(3)  
[ ]( )
( )),,(),,()1(      
),,()1(),,(),,(
SzxUSzxUxx
SzxUxSzxUxSzxUx
d
dx
DCx
DCCx
−−=
−+−=
α
ατ
(4a)  
( )
( )),,(),,()1(
  ),,(),,(
SzxUSzxUzz
SzxUSzxUzz
CHCLCCzc
CCLCzcC
−−
=−=
α
α&
(4b)  
( )
( )),,(),,()1(     
),,(),,(
SzxUSzxUzz
SzxUSzxUzz
DHDLDDzD
DDLDzDD
−−=
−=
α
α&
The ‘dot’ notation in equations (4a,b) means d/dt, where dt refers to a time 
interval that differs from dτ (as in (3)).  Specifically, we assume τ=εt, where 
ε∈(0,1) is a fixed parameter, so that behaviors change on a faster time scale than 
does identity.  We return to this concept momentarily.  IU  refers to the average 
payoff for agents with identity I. 
The dynamic system also includes resource stock dynamics.  Assume the 
resource stock adjusts as a “fast variable” and that growth is quadratic: 
(5a) SEzxzxSEzxxzSBrSS HDCLDC )]1)(1()1([])1([)( −−+−−−+−−=& , 
where B is the carrying capacity and r is a growth parameter.  We earlier defined 
low effort level EL as the level that yields greater equilibrium profits than high 
effort level EH.  It is therefore straightforward to verify that the equilibrium 
resource stock when everyone chooses low effort, denoted rEBS L /−= , must 
lie on the upward sloping part of the growth function, i.e., 2/BS < (implying 
biological overexploitation) and that EL>rB/2.11 
The dynamic system consists of four state variables, which can be solved 
numerically but which would be difficult to analyze using standard phase-plane 
techniques.  We simplify the problem in two ways to make the analysis more 
tractable.  First, note that the condition ),,(),,( SzxUSzxU DHDL <  holds due to 
our specification in Table 1 (defectors prefer high effort in the absence of 
regulation).  Hence, 0=Dz  becomes a globally stable strategy, and equation (4b) 
may be ignored for now.  In this case, z = zc, and (5a) becomes: 
                                                
11 Having larger equilibrium profits under low effort requires (i) SSBrSSBrSEL )()( −>−=
and (ii) SS > , where rEBS H /−= .  Using (ii), set ς−= SS , where 0>ς  is a parameter, and 
substitute this relation in for S  in (i).  Simplify the resulting expression so that S  is by itself, and 
then take the limit as 0→ς  to yield 2/BS < .  Then solve the equilibrium growth condition, 
when everyone cooperates, to yield 2/)2/()( rBBBrSBrEL =−>−= . 
11
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(5b) SExzSExzSBrSS HCLC ]1[)( −−−−=& . 
Our second simplification stems from the application of Fenichel’s 
Invariant Manifold Theorem [Fenichel, 1979], as our problem meets all three 
conditions required for its application.12  Fenichel’s theorem allows us to 
approximate the solution to the fast-slow system by focusing on the simpler 
problem where ε→0, as the dynamical properties on the slow-time manifold 
where ε→0 are the same as those on the slow-time manifold where ε>0.  As ε→0, 
changes in behaviors occur where identity essentially is held fixed.   
We focus on the slow-time manifold with ε→0, thereby treating the time 
frames as infinitely separated.  Though we assume that ε>0 holds, Fenichel’s 
theorem ensures our qualitative results for the identity dynamics are unaffected by 
this simplification.13  Conversely, changes in identity result in seemingly 
instantaneous behavioral adjustments, from the perspective of time scale τ, as 
ε→0.  This approximation of the true dynamic model has been applied in ecology 
[Ludwig et al., 1978] and economics [Grimsrud and Huffaker, 2006]. 
4. ANALYZING THE DYNAMIC MODEL 
We proceed by analyzing the dynamics of the fast state variables S and Cz  
separately from the slow identity dynamics.  That is, hold x constant and analyze 
the system (4a) and (5b).  We first derive the dS/dt=0 isocline: 
(6) 
)(
)(
HL
H
C EEx
ESBrz −
−−= . 
The denominator of (6) is negative, so the dS/dt=0 isocline is a positively 
sloped line in (S,zC) space. The isocline is depicted in Figure 1, from which we 
                                                
12 Define the vector Y = [S, zc] and redefine the fast dynamic system by ),( xYQY =&  and 
),( xqx Yε=& .  The required conditions are as follows: (i) Q and q are continuous, (ii) a function h
exists such that Y=h(x) solves 0=Y& , and (iii) the real parts of the eigenvalues of )),(( xxhQY  are 
all nonzero for all relevant values of x [Fenichel, 1979, Buzzi et al. 2005].  Conditions (i) and (ii) 
are satisfied by construction, and condition (iii) has been verified numerically. 
13 The slow-time dynamics with ε>0 are calculated as asymptotic expansions of the solution on the 
slow-time manifold with ε→0 [Fenichel, 1979; Kaper and Kaper, 2002]. We limit the slow 
manifold approximations inserted into slow equation (9) to only the first order terms (the steady 
state levels), and ignore higher order terms where ε>0.  Kokotovic [1984] analyzes a problem in 
this fashion and finds that the error is quite small even when ε is significantly larger than zero. 
12
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see ]1,0[∈Cz  for xSSS ≤≤ , where rEBS H /−=  is the equilibrium stock when 
no one cooperates and rxEExBSxSxS LHx /])1[()1( +−−=+−=  is the 
equilibrium stock for the current value of x when all conservationists cooperate.  
The horizontal phase arrows point towards the dS/dt=0 isocline (or, increasing zC
implies effort falls and the stock increases). 
Figure 1a: No outrage costs (no strategic complementarities) 
Now consider the dynamics of cooperative behavior.  Setting (4a) equal to 
zero, we obtain two corner equilibria, 0and1 == CC zz , and a curve of interior 
equilibria implicitly defined by: 
(7)   ),,(),,( SzxUSzxU CHCL = . 
 An interior equilibrium occurs when xzz C=  takes on such a value that 
individuals who have a cooperative identity are indifferent between actually 
cooperating or not.  differentiating (7) gives the slope of the interior isocline: 
(8) 
}/)],,(),,([{
/)],,(),,([
zSzxUSzxUx
SSzxUSzxU
dS
dz
CHCL
CLCHC
∂−∂
∂−∂= . 
zC 
0
0 B
1
S  
dS/dt=0
dzC/dt=0 
Sx 
a 
c 
b 
Sz 
dzC/dt=0 
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If the marginal value of S is larger upon applying more effort (as assumed 
in the specified model), the numerator has a positive sign.  The denominator 
should be non-negative by the strategic complementarity property.  Hence, the 
isocline is vertical in the absence of strategic complementarities, and it is 
positively-sloped in the case of strategic complementarities.  The vertical phase 
arrows point south to the right of the isocline: from (4a), an increase in S, so as to 
move below the isocline, results in 0<Cz& .   
Two phase planes are presented in Figure 1.  Figure 1a depicts “no outrage 
costs” and hence no strategic complementarities.  In Figure 1b, outrage costs are 
of sufficient magnitude to create strong strategic complementarities.  In each case, 
we have assumed the two isoclines cross (cases where the isoclines do not cross 
are explored below in our discussion of replicator dynamics for x).  Thus we get 
three equilibria: a, b, and c.14  The stability of these equilibria (in fast time) 
depends on the magnitude of the strategic complementarities.   
Figure 1b – Outrage costs resulting in strong strategic complementarities 
In Figure 1a, equilibria a and c are conditionally stable: they may only be 
reached for initial values of zc that are either zero or unity.  In contrast, analyzing 
the eigenvalues of the system learns that equilibrium b is locally stable, and is 
                                                
14 An infinite number of equilibria also exist along the vertical axis with S=0, but we do not 
consider this degenerative case as it is unstable provided S >0. 
zkS
zC 
0
0 B
1
S  
dS/dt=0
dzC/dt=0 
Sx 
a 
c 
b 
W
dzC/dt=0 
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either an improper node or a focus point (details available on request).  The 
dynamics are qualitatively the same when strategic complementarities are 
introduced, provided these complementarities are sufficiently weak that the 
dzc/dt=0 icocline still cuts the dS/dt=0 isocline from below.  
In Figure 1b, the strategic complementarities are sufficiently strong 
causing an upward sloping dzc/dt=0 icocline that cuts the dS/dt=0 isocline from 
above.  The stability properties are different in this case, as equilibria a and c are 
stable while b is a saddle point. The separatrix associated with the saddle is 
denoted by W.  For initial points above W, the system moves to c.  For initial 
points below W, the system moves to a.  From this perspective, long-term 
cooperation is more likely to be sustained if the initial number of people choosing 
low effort levels is sufficiently high. 
However, and unlike OEVG’s [2007] model, we find the long run stability 
of the fast-time equilibria may be compromised as the share of identities, x, in the 
community slowly evolves according to (3).  The evolution of identities depends 
on which behavioral equilibrium is attained, a, b or c.  To clarify this issue, we 
modify equation of motion (3): 
(9) ( )))(),(,())(),(,()1( **** xSxzxUxSxzxUxx
d
dx
DCx −−= ατ , 
where the relations )()( ** xxzxz C= , and )(* xS  indicate the steady state 
levels emerging from the fast dynamics, conditional on x.  The ultimate 
equilibrium outcome depends on whether the fast system settles at equilibrium a, 
b, or c, and possibly also on the initial value of x.  A full analysis, however, 
requires us to return to the specified model.  We deal with the cases of no strategic 
complementarities and sufficiently strong strategic complementarities separately. 
4.1 Common pool management with no strategic complementarities 
We begin with the case of no outrage costs (k=g=0), and therefore no strategic 
complementarities.  The 0/ =dtdzC  isocline is the vertical line: 
(10) 
LH
c
s
z EE
wSS −==  > 0. 
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Initially we assume ),( xz SSS ∈ , so that the dynamics are qualitatively 
similar to those represented in Figure 1a.15  Specifically, steady states a and c are 
conditionally stable, while the interior steady state b is a locally stable, improper 
node (see appendix).  We focus on the case where the system initially moves to 
equilibrium b, as the other cases are more degenerate and cannot be attained in 
finite time unless the system begins at the boundary starting values zc=0 or zc=1 
(see equations (4a) and (4b)).16  
Equilibrium b in Figure 1a occurs at the point defined by S* = Sz and *Cz  = 
)](/[])([ HLHz EExESBr −−− .  This point will slowly change over time because 
*
Cz  depends on x, which evolves at a comparatively slow pace.  The evolution of 
the share of identities are described by plugging the fast-system equilibrium b into 
equation (9): 
(11) [ ])()()1( CsDoDoCox wwxwwxxddx +−+−α=τ . 
Three equilibria are 0* =x , 1* =x , and ]/[][ˆ* CODoCSDo wwwwxx ++==  > 
0.  Note that 1ˆ <x  only occurs when COSCw w< : it is “less expensive” to act 
against one’s identity than to interact with individuals with a different identity.  If 
this condition is not satisfied, then xˆ >1 and 0* =x  is globally stable for all initial 
values of x<1.  For interior values of xˆ  the equilibrium xˆ  must be unstable, while 
0* =x  and 1* =x  are each locally stable.  Equilibrium 0* =x  will be pursued 
for initial values of x smaller than xˆ , and 1* =x  will be pursued otherwise.     
Hence, )1,0(ˆ ∈x  has two scenarios ( 0→x  or 1→x ), with multiple 
forces at play.  In addition to the conventional extra harvest benefits for defectors 
(pulling the system towards x*=0), identity-based benefits and costs might pull the 
system in the opposite direction.  Recall that individuals derive benefits from 
interacting with their own type. If the number of conservationists is sufficiently 
large, the fraternal complementarities associated with being a conservationist 
might dominate the harvest benefits from being a defector, even if the latter yields 
greater harvest benefits.  The initial population share of the two identities, vis-à-
vis threshold value xˆ , thus matters for long run outcomes.  Note that these 
                                                
15 The case where xzS S> , comes up in the next section (Figure 2a), and so we delay our 
discussion of that case for now. 
16 Moreover, if the system happens to start with zc=0 or zc=1, then not even changes in x will move 
the system away from these equilibrium values; see equation (4a), and also note that changes in x 
can shift the equilibrium point c horizontally, as we describe below in relation to Figure 2a. 
16
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fraternal complementarities generate a self-propelling force.  As the share of 
conservationists in the population increases, welfare of all conservationists is 
further raised due to enhanced identity benefits, and eventually the population will 
“snowball” towards a homogenous identity of conservationists.  The same applies 
for increases in the share of defectors. 
In the scenario where the share of conservationists in the population 
declines ( 0→x ), defectors acting in accordance with their type are better off than 
conservationists (who might either act against their type, choosing high effort 
levels and incurring the associated identity costs, or foregoing the immediate 
benefits from choosing high effort).  As x takes on smaller values, the fast system 
is affected.  The dS/dt=0 isocline pivots counter-clockwise on the horizontal 
intercept SS =  (see equation 6) so that zc increases to restore the fast 
equilibrium: dS/dt=0 at S=Sz.  As the share of conservationists in the population 
shrinks, holding S constant, conservationist welfare falls regardless of effort 
choice but remaining conservationists have no immediate incentive to switch 
effort strategies.   
Figure 2a – Isoclines do not intersect (no outrage costs) 
However, S starts to fall because everyone who switches to become a 
defector will now use high effort (note that prior to switching some of the 
conservationists chose low effort).  Once S goes down, the relative gain from 
zC 
0
0 B
1
S  
dS/dt=0
dzC/dt=0 
Sx 
c 
Sz 
dzC/dt=0 
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defecting falls so that a larger fraction of the remaining conservationists is 
inclined to cooperate.  At first, the result is that the equilibrium value of S remains 
constant at Sz, while zc steadily increases: an increase in defectors leads to greater 
cooperation among conservationists.  But eventually, as x continues to decrease, 
the isoclines separate (i.e. the interior equilibrium disappears) and the dynamics 
become as in Figure 2a.  All remaining conservationists choose low effort as zc=1 
becomes a stable node.  But eventually no conservationists are left.  The long run 
equilibrium (when dx/dτ = dz/dt = dS/dt = 0) in this scenario is SS =*  and x* = 0. 
The scenario 1→x  represents the opposite case where conservationists 
are better off than defectors, even in the case where they act against their type and 
suffer an identity cost.  So many conservationists are in the population that they 
enjoy sufficiently large identity benefits from interacting with their own kind.  
Initially, when S is constant, conservationists have no incentive to switch effort 
strategies.  However, S starts to rise because not everyone who switches from 
defector to conservationist uses high effort (as they did prior to the switch).  Once 
S rises, the relative gain from defecting increases and a larger fraction of the 
conservationists will choose high effort.  The result is that the equilibrium value 
of S remains constant at Sz, while zc steadily decreases to some positive, 
equilibrium value.  In other words, a decrease in the share of defectors leads to 
less cooperation among conservationists.  The long-term equilibrium of the 
system is 1* =x , zSS =* , and )]/[(])([* HLHzC EEESBrz −−−= .  Society in 
this case consists only of conservationists, although some members choose low 
effort and others choose high effort levels.  Individuals are indifferent between 
these choices and thus share identical welfare levels.  The high-effort types have 
larger harvest revenues, but incur offsetting identity costs from acting against 
their type. 
Result 1: In the absence of outrage costs, conservationists 
respecting the moral norm of restraint are more (less) likely to 
cooperate as the number of defectors is increasing (decreasing).  
The full equilibrium is characterized by either (i) a homogenous 
population of defectors selecting high effort, resulting in maximum 
stock depletion, or (ii) a population of conservationists displaying 
heterogeneous behavior (some choosing high effort, others 
choosing low effort), resulting in intermediate stock depletion. 
The result of homogeneous identities is different from OEVG.  In their 
model, complementarities act on behavior and allow for a mix of behaviors.  The 
18
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analogous complementarities in our model act on identity, yet homogeneous 
identities emerge.  However, like OEVG, we still find heterogeneous behaviors 
are possible in the long run equilibrium. 
4.2 Common pool management with strong strategic complementarities 
Now consider the scenario where outrage costs are sufficiently large to result in 
dynamics as in Figure 1b.  In addition to the ‘multiple forces’ discussed above, an 
additional force – strategic complementarities – now pulls the system in a certain 
direction.  The payoffs in Table 1 imply we must rewrite the dynamic equation of 
the share of cooperators, equation (4a), as: 
(12) ])1()()[1( kxzSEEwzz
dt
dz
CLH
c
sCCzc
C −−−−−= α , 
so that the relevant isocline now reads as: 
(13) 
xk
kwSEEz
c
sLH
C
+−−= )( . 
This isocline is positively-sloped, ∂zc/∂S>0, and has a vertical intercept at 
)/()( LH
C
szk EEkwS −−= .  Unlike the earlier specification without outrage costs, 
the dynamics of behavior are now a function of identity shares in the population.  
As x increases, the dzc/dt = 0 isocline rotates clockwise, becoming “flatter”.  
Conversely, as x → 0, the isocline approaches the vertical line zkSS = . From 
Figure 1b is evident that, again, three potential steady states for the fast-dynamics 
exist: equilibria a, b and c, where a and c are (locally) stable steady states, and b
is a saddle point (see appendix).  Because no planner can “place the system on the 
separatrix”, the probability of arriving at the saddle is essentially zero and may be 
ignored.  Hence zc → 0 or zc → 1, depending on whether the starting value (S, zc) 
is above or below separatrix W.  After the fast dynamics have steered the system 
to either zc=0 or zc=1, it will stay there regardless of what happens to the share of 
conservationists, x, which changes over time as spelled out in section 4.1.  
Whether x increases or decreases depends on its initial value relative to a 
threshold level that depends on the equilibrium value of zc, denoted )( Czx
) :   
( )
rEEkww
wk
r
EBEE
x
LH
D
o
C
o
D
o
H
LH
/)(
)1(ˆ 2−−++
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−
= ,  and 
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An initial condition of )( Czxx
)>  implies x→1.17  Conservationists acting 
in accordance with their type are better off than defectors, because their level of 
abundance implies that fraternal complementarities (identity benefits) can 
compensate for lower harvest revenues.  In contrast, )( Czxx
)<  implies x→0, or 
the case where defectors are better off so that this type gradually replaces the 
conservationists. 
Figure 2b – Isoclines do not intersect (strong strategic complementarities) 
As the share of conservationists is updated, the zc = 0 equilibrium will 
remain locally (or globally) stable as x changes, even if x takes on the value of 
one.  However, the zc = 1 equilibrium could change from being locally stable to 
conditionally stable as x changes.  When x → 0, both isoclines rotate 
counterclockwise and eventually separate when x becomes sufficiently small to 
                                                
17 Specifically, ]/)(/[])/)([()1( 2 rEEkwwwkrEBEEx LH
D
o
C
o
D
oHLH −−++++−−=)
and ]/[])/)([()0( DoCoDoHLH wwwrEBEEx ++−−=) . 
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weaken the effects of strategic complementarities (since outrage costs depend on 
both x and k). The dynamics for this case are illustrated in Figure 2b.  Here, the 
equilibrium zc = 1 is conditionally stable while zc=0 is globally stable for all 
starting points other than zc = 1.  However, one might argue that the value of zc is 
immaterial, as x = 0 implies nobody cooperates anyway.   
Result 2: In the presence of outrage costs the full equilibrium is 
characterized by either (i) a homogenous population of defectors 
disregarding the conservation norm and choosing high effort 
levels, resulting in maximum stock depletion, or (ii) a homogenous 
population of conservationists respecting the conservation norm 
and choosing low effort to conserve the stock.   
The result of homogeneous behaviors is consistent with results in Sethi 
and Somanathan.  In their model and in ours, complementarities act on behavior.  
But we find complementarities also affect the choice of identities.   
5. INTRODUCING REGULATION  
We now add regulation to the model in the form of an effort-based fine.   
The regulator adopts an objective of promoting conservation (i.e., aiming for the 
“cooperative outcome” by inducing individuals to adopt low harvest effort level 
E1), which in our model yields the greatest long run equilibrium benefits.  This 
long run focus is a reasonable alternative to a more complicated model where the 
regulator also cares about welfare along the path to the long run outcome.  Of 
course a welfare cost is associated with ignoring the transition path, regardless of 
whether identity-related costs and benefits arise in the model.  But an additional 
long run cost may arise when identity is relevant, which is our focus.  
The fine we consider works by punishing deviations from “the cooperative 
norm.”  Since each individual’s identity type is unobservable for the regulator 
(though the aggregate proportion x may be known), we consider fines that are 
applied uniformly across identity types.  In other words, the regulator cares about 
behavior, not payoffs or intentions, and anyone choosing high effort rates expects 
to be fined a penalty F (see Table 1).18 Regulation has three effects.  First, the fine 
affects relative behavioral payoffs and hence the dzc/dt=0 isocline as 
conservationists are now more inclined to select low effort levels, ceteris paribus.  
                                                
18 Qualitatively similar results are obtained when introducing a tax on effort or harvest (in excess 
of the norm or otherwise).  
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Second, for a given behavior, the fine affects relative identity payoffs and hence 
the slow dynamics (dx/dτ).  Third, and most importantly, the fine may induce 
defectors to choose low effort so that zD>0 is now feasible.  A full model, 
therefore, involves four state variables: zD, zc, x and S.  
The regulator seeks a fine F to induce both defectors and conservationists 
to choose low effort, EL.  The minimum penalty that achieves this satisfies (for the 
more general case of outrage costs):  
(14) })1()(  ,)1()max{( gzwSEEkzwSEEF DSLH
C
SLH −++−−+−−= . 
This critical fine neutralizes the net benefits, in terms of harvest profits as 
well as the identity costs and benefits, from choosing high effort so that 
individuals voluntarily switch from high to low effort.  How does this fine 
compare with one that does not account for identity-related payoffs and costs?  
From (14), the minimum fine that ignored the role of identity would be set 
according to: 
(14a) F* = (EH – EL)S. 
Comparison with (14) indicates that a minimally-set fine that ignores 
identity would fail to eliminate all high effort choices.  Similarly, to compute an 
optimal fine one needs to know the composition of the population in terms of 
identities.  Regulators can learn about the shares of cooperators and defectors via, 
for example, economic experiments (e.g., Bouma et al. 2008 use trust games to 
measure social capital in communities in India).   
The critical fine in (14) varies over time as the state of the world changes.  
The fine is increasing in S, as the opportunity cost of cooperating is increasing in 
S.  In contrast, the fine is decreasing in z: more people cooperating provides 
greater incentives to others to follow.  Once the zD = zC = 1 equilibrium is 
achieved, the fine can be dropped (according to (4a) and (4b), the system has 
reached a permanent outcome).19  Moreover, zD = zC = 1 results in z = 1, and 
outrage costs vanish from (14), so the difference between the no-outrage model 
and the outrage model disappears (i.e. no behavioral externalities).  With all of 
society cooperating on conservation, the stock settles at rEBSS L /
* −== . 
                                                
19 This is an artifact of the specification of replicator dynamics, where people switch behavior if 
they observe that other people are better off.  In a more general setting where people can compute 
an optimal behavioral strategy, the fine F would always be necessary to deter defectors from 
choosing EH. In that case the fine can be maintained as a threat (while never actually having to 
collect on it), and the zD=zC=1 equilibrium is locally stable. 
22
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 13
Brought to you by | Wageningen UR (Wageningen UR)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 2/28/12 11:06 AM
At this point, we can restrict the analysis to considering the dynamics of 
the share of population types x.  The fine only indirectly affects these dynamics 
via its role in attaining the zD=zC=1 equilibrium.  Setting dx/dτ=0, we obtain the 
interior equilibrium: 
(15) C
O
D
O
D
S
D
O
ww
wwx +
−=~  < 1. 
If 0~ <x , then x = 1 is globally stable, so that the entire population will 
eventually consist of conservationists choosing low effort.  However, for 
1~0 << x , then (15) again defines a separatrix: xx ~>  leads to x=1 and xx ~<  
leads to x=0.  It can be verified that x~  is the smallest of the thresholds (i.e., 
xxx ),ˆ~ < ).  Thus, by affecting harvesting behavior, the fine impacts identity 
dynamics and increases the likelihood that individuals will become 
conservationists.  However, the fine does not directly impact the threshold x~ , and 
so the fine cannot guarantee an all-conservationist outcome (x=1).  An outcome 
where all individuals are defectors, choosing low effort EL, is inevitable for 
sufficiently low starting values of x. 
The long run welfare effects of regulation are necessarily ambiguous.  If 
the fine increases the stock by inducing a behavioral shift from high to low 
harvest effort, but leaves the identity composition of the community unaffected, 
then regulation unleashes two opposing forces.  First, on the beneficial side, 
restraint in harvesting effort raises equilibrium harvesting levels (even if harvest 
effort levels fall).  Additional harvests in the steady state represents the 
conventional component of welfare.  But, second, the behavioral switch induced 
by regulation also leads to identity-based costs whenever xx ~<  – whenever the 
long-term population consists of defectors forced to act against their type.  This 
cost is derived from individual utility measured in a static sense – representing a 
“flow” of costs.  One instrument cannot generally control two externalities 
(common property and identity externalities in this case).  Assuming that we want 
to take all preferences – including those of defectors – at face value, then the 
following observation holds. 
Result 3: An incentive that encourages the appropriate behavior 
(conservation) by all may not encourage everyone to switch to a 
conservationist identity and respect conservationist norms.  The 
long-run welfare effects of the regulation are therefore ambiguous 
in an identity-based model of common pool management.  Welfare 
is reduced when the long-term population consists of defectors who 
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act against their type, provided that the associated identity cost 
D
Sw  is sufficiently large to overcome potential harvest gains 
associated with the cooperative outcome.  Even if welfare is 
increased, it is still lower than it would be in a homogeneous 
population of conservationists. 
Our model thus challenges that unregulated common properties benefit 
from regulation aimed at stimulating cooperative behavior.  The combination of 
missing property rights and identity effects implies that the standard second-best 
results apply [e.g., Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956]: addressing one market 
imperfection (overharvesting due to imperfect property rights) might not improve 
welfare if the system has other imperfections.   
While full cooperation maximizes aggregate long-run profits and promotes 
stock conservation, it is an open question whether regulators should use a single 
effort-based tool to strive for this outcome if they care predominantly about 
community welfare.  The composition of identity in the population of harvesters 
matters: if sufficient community members have a conservationist identity, striving 
for cooperation is efficient.   However, when defectors dominate the population, 
harvesting at the high effort level may maximize welfare. If regulation cannot 
induce identity shifts, it may be efficient to have systems dominated by defectors 
go unregulated or else to use additional instruments.  This goes back to earlier 
discussions about needing one policy instrument to address each externality (e.g. 
Tinbergen 1952), which requires addressing both effort and identity choices in the 
current model. 
Two final observations are relevant here.  First, we have argued that 
regulation yields ambiguous welfare effects when the share of defectors in the 
population is high (i.e. x is low).  But exactly in this context regulators may 
perceive a need to intervene.  While the welfare effects are positive in the 
presence of sufficient conservationists, this is also the case where intervention 
might appear redundant.  In other words, regulation works when it is really not all 
that necessary, and might backfire when the decentralized outcome appears 
particularly bad.  Second, an omnipotent government may be able to implement a 
policy that mimics the social first-best – selecting time-varying policies that 
address both effort and identity choices, so as to steer the system towards the first-
best outcome.  However, it is unclear whether this is feasible as identities, unlike 
behaviors, are not observable.  
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5.1 Extension: context-dependent identity effects 
Until now we have ignored the possibility that punishment can also impact on 
behavior through changing identity-based benefits and costs.  For example, 
evidence suggests that external intervention may crowd out intrinsic (i.e. identity-
based) motivations for norm-abiding behavior.  Levitt and Dubner [2005] discuss 
how payments for blood donations reduced supply, and how a children daycare 
center discovered that introducing fines for late pickups resulted in more parents 
picking up their kids late [see also Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, for empirical 
evidence, and Jansen and Mendys-Kamphorst, 2004, for a theoretical model].  
Vollaard and Koning [2005] found an inverse relation between a pet tax on dogs 
and the propensity of dog owners to clean up after their dog.  Some evidence 
suggests that the same interplay between regulation and social capital may apply 
in the commons [Hatcher et al., 2000; Sutinen et al., 1990]. 
We capture such phenomena by assuming that a penalty F may relieve 
conservationists from the guilt they feel when violating the norm: )(FwCS  with 
0/)( <∂∂ FFwCS .  The fine then ‘crowds out’ the intrinsic motivation to follow 
(moral) norms, and it is an open question whether monetary incentives or intrinsic 
motivations do a better job in facilitating cooperation.  Alternatively, punishment 
may mitigate cooperators’ feelings of outrage when meeting a defector.  
Depending on how we modify the payoff structure, intervention can provide a 
disincentive to follow the norm.  Again, the welfare effects would be ambiguous.   
We can easily formalize this a bit, although we leave a full analysis to 
future work.  How does raising an arbitrary fine (smaller than the critical fine 
derived in (14)), F, impact behavior of conservationists?   As an illustration, 
consider the case of no outrage costs, and assume that prior to intervention the 
system is in the “heterogeneous equilibrium” discussed in section 4.1 and 
summarized in Result 1: 1* =x , zFSS =* , and 
)]/[(])([* HLHzFC EEESBrz −−−= , where )/()( LHCSzF EEFwS −+= .  The 
system is in locally stable equilibrium b (see Fig 1a), and the effect of regulation 
on conservation is determined by movements of the relevant isoclines across the 
phase plane.  Note that, for an arbitrary fine F, the dzc/dt = 0 isocline, as well as 
the equilibrium resource stock, are described by zFSS =* .  The impact of 
intervention on this isocline is as follows: 
  
(16) 
LH
C
S
dtdz
zF
EE
F
w
dF
dS
c
−
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
=
=
1
0/
. 
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Hence, for 1/ −<∂∂ FwCS , the isocline shifts to the left, and the resource 
stock will become smaller.  More conservationists act against their type, because 
the identity-based costs associated with a-typical behavior are smaller as formal 
rules have crowded out informal rules of restraint.  Hence, the effects of 
regulation are ambiguous for behavior, welfare and stock conservation.  
6. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The management of common property resources receives ample academic 
attention.  Economists explore the efficiency and equity considerations of 
communal management, and the role of common resources as a safety net for the 
poor has been extensively discussed.  Yet, experiences with respect to the 
management of CPR are diverging, and much remains unknown about the 
conditions under which CPR are sustainably managed.  This paper tries to 
contribute to a better understanding of CPR management by analyzing the 
interaction between resources, harvesting effort, and the evolution of social 
norms. 
Building on the identity model of Akerlof and Kranton, we distinguish 
between beliefs (values) and behavior.20  We analyze the implications of a 
heterogeneous set of beliefs and values among resource users, and allow 
individuals to slowly update their beliefs and values in response to economic 
pressure.  The latter feature represents a methodological contribution, and 
generates a model where people self-select into a set of preferences.  We view the 
share of resource users ‘believing’ in norms of harvesting restraint as a proxy of 
social capital.  Hence our model allows a systematic analysis of the accumulation 
and erosion of social capital in the commons.   
Adjusting one’s deep-seated beliefs is a relatively slow process—slower 
than adjusting one’s behavior.  The potential mismatch between behavior and 
beliefs sets the stage for various dynamic adjustment processes.  We distinguish 
between conventional ‘harvest payoffs’ and ‘identity-derived payoffs’ following 
from own behavior and behavior of others.  Identity-based payoffs are non-
pecuniary costs emerging when acting against one’s ‘internalized deep values’ (or 
observing others violating such norms).  Identity-based benefits also emerge when 
individuals interact with others with whom they share these deep values, so that 
total payoffs of behavioral strategies depend on both own and others behavior, as 
                                                
20 Distinguishing between identity and behavior is important as highlighted by a littering study by 
Cialdini et al. (1993).  While littering behavior is influenced more by social attitudes (norms) 
towards littering rather than the individual’s perception of what is typically done in a specific 
setting, Cialdini et al. document that littering behavior is influenced by the actions of others.  
Individuals can act against a norm they have internalized. 
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well as the composition of the population in terms of the distribution of norms.  
We demonstrate that in the absence of formal or informal enforcement, such a 
system is characterized by multiple equilibria, and identify conditions under 
which social capital is ‘built up’ or ‘broken down.’  We also demonstrate that 
regulation aimed at internalizing harvest externalities, in a context where 
identities matter, generally produces ambiguous welfare effects.  Local welfare 
may benefit or suffer from penalizing overharvesting. 
What is the contribution to the literature?  First, the paper provides a 
conceptual contribution to the CPR literature.  Experimental evidence (e.g., 
Andreoni 1988, Fischbacher et al. 2001) and case studies (e,g, Feeny et al. 1996, 
Baland and Platteau 1996) suggest individuals are motivated by a range of factors, 
including non-pecuniary rewards and altruism.  Many agents respect sharing 
norms, taboos, and norms encouraging a sustainable livelihood.  The model 
structure in this paper provides a framework to analyze the interaction between 
norms, behavior and economic outcomes.  Second, the model allows studying the 
welfare implications of interventions when people can adjust both their behavior 
as well as their beliefs.  Third, the identity model generates a wealth of stable 
equilibria, encompassing outcomes of earlier work as ‘special cases.’  For 
example, earlier work finds equilibria where everybody respects or rejects norms 
of restraint, or predicts equilibria with ‘mixed behaviors.’  In contrast, our model 
outlines conditions under which heterogeneous and homogenous stable equilibria 
will occur—outcomes with mixed identities and behaviors, or outcomes where all 
agents are of the same type and act the same, respectively. 
Incorporating identity-based costs and benefits to the domain of resource 
economics sets the stage for a range of interesting analyses.  One avenue for 
future work to improve the current analysis is to incorporate decentralized 
punishment.  Another interesting area for future work is formally deriving welfare 
maximizing regulations in the presence of identity effects.  
APPENDIX 
A. Stability of the interior equilibrium, b, in the case of no outrage costs 
The two equations of motion are: 
(A1) ( )csHLCCzcC wSEEzzz +−−= ][)1(α& , and 
(A2) SExzSExzSBrSS HCLC ]1[)( −−−−=& . 
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To determine the eigenvalues, we want to linearize these equations around the 
equilibrium point b, which is 
(A3) 
)(
)( **
HL
H
C EEx
ESBrz −
−−= , 
LH
c
s
z EE
wSS −==
* . 
Using Mathematica 7.0 (Wolfram 2008) to derive the eigenvalues for this system, 
we obtain: 
(A4) [ ] ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−±− )1(42
1 *222
CzLHzczz zxSEESrrS α , 
where the first term in parentheses is negative and the second term in parentheses 
is either (i) imaginary, or (ii) real but less than zrS .  Case (i) results in a stable 
focus, while case (ii) results in a stable node. 
B. Stability of the interior equilibrium, b, in the case of outrage costs 
The two equations of motion are: 
(B1) ( )kxzSEEwzzz CLHcsCCzcC )1(][)1( −−−−−= α& ,and 
(B2) SExzSExzSBrSS HCLC ]1[)( −−−−=& . 
To determine the eigenvalues, we want to linearize these equations around the 
equilibrium point b, which is 
(B3) 
])[(
)][()(
2
*
rkEEx
kwEEbrEEEz
LH
c
sLHHLH
C −−
+−−−−= ,  
rkEE
brEkwEES
LH
L
c
sLH
−−
−+−= 2* )(
)()( . 
Using Mathematica 7.0 (Wolfram 2008) to derive the eigenvalues for this system, 
we obtain: 
(B4) [ ]( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−+± *22 4)1(21 SxEErkzzAA LHCCzcα , 
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where )1( *** CCzc zkzrSA −+−= α .  The discriminant in expression (B4) is positive 
and greater than A2 for the phase plane illustrated in Figure 1b.  In particular, the 
second term in the discriminant is positive as x < 1 and as [ ]2LHErk E−>  when 
the dS/dt = 0 isocline cuts the 0/ =dtdzC  isocline from below, as in Figure 1b.  
Hence, the square root term in (B4) is greater than A, resulting in one positive and 
one negative eigenvalue.  This means the equilibrium point b must be a saddle.  
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